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Abstract Today the public key technology enjoys wide ac-
ceptance and use. Countless network protocols and applica-
tions use it to guarantee strong authentication and privacy.
Usability and maintainability of this technology remains
problematic, however. It is still very cumbersome and time-
consuming to set up an enterprise Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) that has relationships with external parties. The emer-
gence of PKI bridges, while solving one set of problems,
created a new one: management of distributed trust became
much more difficult. Complexity of the global PKI mesh and
its decentralized nature created a need for a service with a
unified view of the global PKI. In this paper we propose
a PKI search engine that can provide such a service. The
engine supports facilities for certificate and certificate revo-
cation list (CRL) discovery, testing and troubleshooting of
extra-enterprise PKIs, certificate revocation status lookup,
certification path construction and validation, all based on
the Internet-mined and user-registered information.
Keywords Public Key Infrastructure · PKI mesh · X.509
certificate · Certification authority · Certification path
discovery and validation · Certificate discovery
1 Introduction
Adams and Just attribute the beginning of the modern Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) to late 1993–early 1994 [2]. This
is when the recently published 1993 version of the ITU-
T Recommendation X.509 [39] began to be implemented
on a small scale. This version formulated some of the most
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important approaches to certificates, certification authorities
(CAs) and related concepts.
Since then the public key technology proved its viability
and dynamism. X.509-based PKI is widely used in numer-
ous network protocols: IPSec [9], 802.1x [13], PKINIT [35],
VoIP [30], SSL/TLS [27], S/MIME [25], SAML [6], and
many, many others. It is an enabling technology for such im-
portant and diverse applications as document signing, Web
server security, secure e-mail, Web Services security, virtual
private networks, electronic commerce, and single sign-on
[10].
X.509-based PKI was conceived as an authentication in-
frastructure for the global X.500 directory. As the X.500
project lost its momentum, the vision of a single global
Public Key Infrastructure gave way to the reality of nu-
merous independent, disjoint hierarchical PKIs [1]. This
quickly proved insufficient: for example, the recipient of a
signed e-mail message must belong to the same PKI as the
sender or must explicitly trust the sender’s CA. As business-
to-business applications became widespread, organizations
started to link their PKIs, first by establishing peer-to-peer
relationships between certification authorities, and then by
creating PKI bridges that connect multiple parties into a sin-
gle PKI. This PKI mesh is more complex than a hierarchical
PKI: certification path construction is more involved and be-
comes non-deterministic in a general case [24].1
Figure 1 shows a portion of the global PKI containing
three bridges in the United States: Federal Bridge oper-
ated by the U.S. Government, the pharmaceutical industry
1Identifying all certification paths in the PKI mesh is only possible
through exhaustive search which is not practical. Most relying parties
use heuristic algorithms to narrow down the search space, and differ-
ent algorithms may potentially produce different certification paths—
unless the search process itself is standardized. See, for example, RFC
4158 [8].
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bridge SAFE, and CertiPath, the aerospace and defense in-
dustry bridge. Although fairly complex, Fig. 1 provides only
a high-level—and, thus, simplified—view of the PKI; many
details are not shown:
– The bridges operate more than one certification authority;
some of them are cross-certified with the “main” CA.
– Each leaf node represents an intra-enterprise hierarchical
PKI with multiple CAs in it.
– Some trust relationships are unidirectional, others are
bidirectional.
– Each link is established at one or more assurance lev-
els reflected in the certificatePolicy extensions
of the corresponding cross-certificates. These have to be
taken into account during certification path construction:
what appears to be a transitive trust relationship in Fig. 1
may be broken because of assurance level mismatch.
– Additional restrictions such as name and certification path
length constraints may further complicate prediction of
which certificates are acceptable to a relying party and
which are not.
The global PKI is complex and, as more participants
join in, it will become even more so. Discovery of cer-
tificates suitable for a particular set of security require-
ments, certification path discovery and validation, design,
testing and troubleshooting of externally-facing enterprise
PKIs, and other PKI-related management functions are
time-consuming and costly. On the other hand, much of the
information needed to perform these activities is already
available on the Internet. Oftentimes, however, this infor-
mation is difficult to locate and evaluate.
This paper proposes a service aimed at simplifying the
use and management of the global PKI. Just like Google acts
a single index for the global hyperlinked document corpus
available through the Web, this service can act as a single
index for the global PKI. PKI objects, e.g., X.509 certifi-
cates and certificate revocation lists, found in various repos-
itories on the Internet are themselves examples of hyper-
linked documents (in many cases they contain URLs) pro-
viding additional means for resource discovery and analy-
sis.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 makes the
case for a global PKI search engine. In Sect. 3 we enumer-
ate the services the proposed PKI engine will provide. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the engine’s architecture. Supported PKI ob-
jects, PKI object-containing resources on the Internet and
protocols for their retrieval are discussed in Sect. 5. Sec-
tion 6 covers the non-functional aspects of the proposed
service: scalability, availability and trust. Finally, Sect. 7
discusses related work, and Sect. 8 summarizes the pa-
per.
2 The case for a PKI search engine
In this section we discuss various PKI-related functions per-
formed by end users and administrators, and show how a
PKI search engine can make their job easier.
2.1 End-entity certificate discovery
Public key cryptography provides two primary services to
communicating parties: authenticity and integrity, on the one
hand, and privacy, on the other. If the sender of a message
wants to assure its recipient(s) of its authenticity and/or in-
tegrity, she signs the message often attaching her public key
(in the form of a digital certificate) to the message itself.
Message privacy, however, requires an out-of-band process
of discovery of the recipients’ public keys. The S/MIME
standard provides one means for such discovery: the poten-
tial recipient sends a signed e-mail message to the potential
sender attaching his X.509 encryption certificate to it [25].
This mechanism works if the sender can construct a certi-
fication path from the recipient’s certificate to its trust an-
chor but this is not assured by any means. For example, the
sender may send the first encrypted message long after re-
ceiving the certificate, and the certificate may expire or be
revoked by that time. The sender may not even trust the cer-
tificate because it is not issued by a trusted CA or because
additional constraints imposed by the sender’s enterprise se-
curity policies invalidate the certification path. The recip-
ient may have multiple certificates; sending the correct one
would have solved the problem but how to decide which one
to send? In addition, the S/MIME mechanism is application-
specific (e-mail) and will not work with other applications
such as instant messaging, Web conferencing, etc.
Some mail agents such as Microsoft Outlook can be con-
figured to look up recipients’ certificates on an LDAP server
[4]. The Open Group S/MIME Secure Messaging Architec-
ture [46] goes a step further and defines an LDAP-based cer-
tificate lookup proxy that, given a recipient’s e-mail address,
locates the correct certificate repository (in a list of known
repositories) and fetches an encryption certificate from it if
one exists. These solutions are sufficient when the set of all
possible certificate repositories of interest is relatively small
and static but do not scale as the list of potential e-mail re-
cipients grows.
In contrast, PGP uses a centralized model of certificate
distribution: one or more worldwide repositories store all
end-user certificates where they can be easily found [45].2
Because the X.509-based PKI is inherently distributed, this
approach is not directly applicable to it. But a notion of an
“all-knowing” centralized entity, possibly virtual, is never-
theless attractive.
2Note that PGP also provides a key distribution mechanism similar to
that of S/MIME: encryption keys can be attached to e-mail messages
for future use [11].
J Internet Serv Appl (2010) 1: 83–93 85
Fig. 1 A portion of the global
PKI showing three U.S. PKI
bridges [36, 37, 41]. See also
[34]
2.2 CA certificate discovery
A relying party presented with an end-entity certificate
needs to construct a certification path from that certificate
to one of its trust anchors. This requires discovery and val-
idation of intermediate CA certificates including that of the
end-entity certificate’s issuing CA. Modern PKIs usually re-
quire CAs to include in each certificate one or more point-
ers to locations where certificates issued to them (or by
them) can be found. RFC 5280 stipulates that conforming
CAs may include the Authority Information Ac-
cess (AIA) extension with the access method id-ad-
caIssuers referencing single certificates or repositories
of certificates issued to them [7]. This provides a means for
automatic certification path discovery.3
3The AIA extension is useful when constructing certification paths in
the forward direction, from an end-entity certificate to a trust anchor. A
similar extension is defined to facilitate path construction in the reverse
direction [7].
Unfortunately, many certification authorities do not pop-
ulate these extensions [34]. Some of the most popular rely-
ing party software cannot process them, either. For example,
the Apache Web Server which in January 2008 was running
44.8% of the world’s 794,008 secure Web sites [42] does not
use the AIA extension in its certification path construction
algorithm.4
Operational constraints may also preclude dynamic path
discovery by relying parties: access to the Internet may be
unavailable due to lack of coverage (e.g., for traveling users)
or because of restrictive security policies (e.g., at secure fa-
cilities). Sometimes network access must be carefully struc-
tured and “rationed” to reduce the attack surface of a sys-
tem: for example, an airplane-based relying party may not
want to download intermediate CA certificates in real time
since it may expose potential security vulnerabilities more
frequently [28].
4Apache uses OpenSSL for SSL/TLS support. OpenSSL started to
use the AIA extension only recently, in January 2009, in version
0.9.8j [43].
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In such environments preloading of certificates issued to
intermediate CAs is required [18]. Locating these certifi-
cates, especially when PKI bridges are involved, may not
be trivial. A readily available Web-accessible service should
simplify this task for PKI administrators.
2.3 Certificate revocation status checking
The standard certificate validation process always requires
the checking of the certificate’s revocation status. The re-
vocation status of a certificate is checked either through a
lookup in a certificate revocation list (CRL) [39] or a re-
quest to an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) re-
sponder [21]. OCSP was introduced in response to per-
ceived drawbacks of the CRL mechanism [1]. One of the
drawbacks is that CRLs may potentially become very large:
CRLs of some well-known CAs have already achieved sev-
eral megabytes and continue to grow [29, 32]. This may be-
come prohibitive for bandwidth-constrained devices.
The standard OCSP model allows a third party to provide
a service that translates CRLs into OCSP responses [1]. The
PKI search engine we propose could expand this model by
using a “mega-CRL” backend constructed from CRLs har-
vested from known certification authorities around the world
(Fig. 2).
While OCSP is limited to checking only a certificate’s
revocation status, a more general-purpose protocol has re-
cently been standardized by the IETF: the Server-based Cer-
tificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) [12]. The protocol al-
lows relying parties to delegate certification path construc-
tion and validation to a third party. The third party (some-
times called a validation authority) may use certificates it
receives in an SCVP request as well as those preloaded into
its own database to develop and validate certification paths
for its clients. As with OCSP, the PKI search engine could
act as an SCVP validation authority whose database of cer-
tificates is continually updated from all available resources
on the Internet.
2.4 Trust management
The targeted set of users for an application is defined by a
combination of business and security needs. This set is de-
noted UT in Fig. 3. If the application requires certificate-
based authentication, UT can be unambiguously mapped
into the set CT of acceptable end-user certificates from the
global PKI. At the technical level, five elements define the
set of end-entity certificates acceptable to a relying party:
1. The topology of the global PKI mesh.
2. The choice of trust anchors.
3. The set of cross-certificates issued by the trust anchor
CAs to external CAs, and the validity-constraining ex-
tensions (such as certificate policy identifiers, certificate
Fig. 2 Support for online certificate status checking in the proposed
PKI search engine
policy mappings, and basic, policy and name constraints
[7]) placed in those certificates.
4. The validity-constraining extensions placed in the inter-
mediate CA certificates on every certification path from
CT to the trust anchors.
5. The set of input parameters to the certification path val-
idation algorithm (e.g., name constraints and acceptable
certificate policy identifiers [7]).
A PKI administrator has a number of controls at his dis-
posal to limit the set of end-entity certificates trusted by his
relying party. For example, if all targeted end users come
from the same organization, he may specify the organiza-
tion’s e-mail domain name in the initial-permitted-
subtrees (name constraint) input parameter to the certi-
fication path validation algorithm [7]. If it is known that all
acceptable certificates lie no further than one bridge away
from his chosen trust anchor in the global PKI mesh, he may
place the policy constraint inhibitPolicyMapping [7]
with the value of 1 in the cross-certificate issued by that trust
anchor CA. If all acceptable certificates are required to have
the Extended Key Usage set to a particular value, he
may specify it as a non-standard certification path valida-
tion input parameter if his relying party’s software supports
it [48].
Of these, only the second, third and fifth elements are
under direct control of the relying party’s organization. The
goal of the PKI administrator is to carefully design and im-
plement these elements so that the actual set CA of accept-
able certificates is as close to the set CT (Fig. 3) as possible.
Possession of a valid certificate (and the corresponding pri-
vate key) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for gain-
ing access to an application: an authorization step following
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Fig. 3 The targeted and actual sets of end-user certificates acceptable
to an application
Fig. 4 Certificate-based authentication followed by authorization by a
relying party
authentication ultimately establishes whether the user can
proceed or must be stopped (Fig. 4). The authorization step
will be responsible for granting access to the holders of cer-
tificates in the set CT and denying it to the holders of certifi-
cates in the set CA \ CT .
Many other examples can be constructed. Indeed, the
number of available controls may be quite large, and mul-
tiple options may exist to achieve the same outcome. In
addition, the PKI administrator must have intimate knowl-
edge of the relevant portions of the global PKI. For instance,
the e-mail domain-based name constraint in the example
above will be effective only if all end-user certificates reach-
able in the PKI mesh carry their holders’ e-mail addresses
in the Subject Alternative Name extension; if not,
the name constraint will have no effect. The inhibit-
PolicyMapping constraint from the second example will
preclude the relying party from accepting potentially valid
certificates from a hierarchical PKI (across the bridge) that
uses policy mappings, an unusual but not illegal situation.
Finally, the global PKI mesh is work in progress: the set CA
optimal at a particular time may drift and include more end-
user certificates as new CAs and certificates become part of
the mesh.
These examples show that trust management for a rely-
ing party requires an approach highly tailored to the envi-
ronment for which it is performed, and is likely to remain
so. A PKI search engine, however, could provide visualiza-
tion and analysis tools aimed at simplifying this task for PKI
administrators.
2.5 Trust anchor management
Trust anchors are typically represented as self-signed cer-
tificates. Their distribution is managed through out-of-band
mechanisms. Confidence in the integrity of a trust anchor is
also established via an out-of-band mechanism, for exam-
ple, by checking its fingerprint. Routine trust anchor re-key
operations typically require similar out-of-band checks [26].
Manual fingerprint verification proved to be feasible for oc-
casional use, but it does not scale well [31].
A reputable centralized service could provide self-signed
certificates and verified fingerprints to enterprise administra-
tors worldwide. By polling known sites and certificate repos-
itories it should be able to quickly detect new self-signed
certificates and make them available to its users for down-
load.
Since trust anchors form a foundation of trust in an extra-
enterprise PKI, some administrators may be reluctant to
load self-signed certificates from a third party, however rep-
utable. For them the PKI search engine can provide point
of contact information for the respective CAs. Preliminary
work and testing can be done using self-signed certificates
downloaded from the engine, and production trust anchors
can be established through direct contacts with the CAs’ op-
erating authorities.
2.6 Troubleshooting and testing
Troubleshooting of the path construction and validation
process in PKI meshes remains a difficult and time-con-
suming task [24]. Usually testers have full information only
about their part of the PKI treating the rest of the trust fab-
ric as a “cloud.” A global PKI where CAs possess multiple
keys and support multiple levels of assurance, where PKI
bridges are a norm and where multiple certification paths of
varying quality can be constructed, makes testing difficult if
only partial information is available.
A centralized service with a unified view of the global
PKI mesh can significantly simplify testing and troubles-
hooting. The service should be able to provide on-demand
visualization of the PKI graph and support filtering and
zooming capabilities. The service should also be able to con-
struct and present certification paths for end-entity certifi-
cates based on user-entered criteria.
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3 Services for end users
The PKI search engine will provide a Web-based interface
for (human) end users. The interface will include search and
retrieval functions as well as functions for posting informa-
tion to the search engine. End users will be able to register
certification authorities by providing their self-signed certifi-
cates and point-of-contact information. Optionally, registra-
tion of certificate policy and certification practice statement
documents will be supported. The PKI search engine will
allow users to provide references to PKI objects, objects po-
tentially containing PKI objects, and repositories with such
objects. These references can be used to discover new re-
sources not referenced by any of the resources already avail-
able to the search engine. Users will also be able to directly
upload PKI objects (e.g., X.509 certificates) and objects po-
tentially containing PKI objects (e.g., LDIF files, PKCS #7
objects, etc.).
Many applications and protocols, whose purpose is not
PKI-related, exchange data that, nevertheless, contain PKI-
related information (see Sect. 1). These data can be captured
and mined for PKI objects. For example, S/MIME messages
may have signing and encryption certificates attached [25].
An XML document may contain a signature block carrying
a KeyInfo structure with public keys, X.509 certificates,
or references to them [49]. Logs of various protocol entities
using PKI-based authentication or encryption may also pro-
vide wealth of PKI-related information (public keys, X.509
certificates, key identifiers, issuer and subject names, certifi-
cate serial numbers, etc.) [38]. The engine’s frontend will
allow users to upload these objects as well. Since these ob-
jects represent real operational data, they may contain sen-
sitive information. The engine is only interested in already
existing, public PKI objects, however; this additional infor-
mation is not relevant to its work and can be safely removed
on the client. Depending on the type of the raw data, it will
be done via scripts (e.g., JavaScript), applets (e.g., Java), or
browser extensions.
Search and retrieval functionality supported by the PKI
search engine will allow users to find information about cer-
tification authorities by performing exact and approximate
search by the CAs’ distinguished name, key identifier, pub-
lic key and certificate policy identifiers, and search for X.509
certificates and CRLs by providing subject names, subject
alternative names (such as e-mail addresses, URLs, DNS
names, IP addresses), key identifiers, public keys, key usage,
validity dates, certificate policy identifiers and other parame-
ters as search criteria.
The PKI search engine will provide a rich set of visual-
ization tools to end users. It will be able to display various
connectivity components of the global PKI mesh, layers (for
example, based on assurance level), hierarchical PKIs and so
on, based on user-entered criteria.
A number of services for programmatic access ought
to be provided as well. To support mail agents relying on
LDAP-based repositories for discovery of end-user encryp-
tion certificates (see Sect. 2.1), it will provide an LDAP in-
terface to perform lookups based on the recipients’ e-mail
addresses and other attributes. The engine will support the
HTTP-based certificate store access protocol defined in RFC
4387 [15]. That protocol supports certificate lookup opera-
tions based on several types of certificate hashes, key iden-
tifiers, and various subject name forms.
The PKI search engine will also host an OCSP respon-
der [21] and an SCVP validation authority [12] to provide
revocation status checking, and certification path develop-
ment and validation services, respectively.5 The engine will
also host X-KISS Locate and Validate services [16] to
allow clients to find X.509v3 certificates and public keys,
and to validate X.509v3 certificates.6
4 Architecture
The architecture for the proposed PKI search engine is
shown in Figs. 5 (backend) and 6 (frontend). The system’s
core is Store whose primary role is to act as a central reposi-
tory of PKI objects. Store will also contain housekeeping in-
formation for the various components of the search engine:
location identifiers (for example, Universal Resource Iden-
tifiers), metainformation about objects, processing histories,
information about sites, etc. In addition, Store will contain
information about certification authorities (CAs) and their
points of contact.
PKI objects are populated into Store by Content Man-
ager. Content Manager’s responsibility is to take any ob-
jects found by other components and extract PKI objects
from them. For example, an LDIF file representing a dump
of an LDAP directory may contain certificates and CRLs,
a PKCS #7 object—one or more X.509 certificates, a SOAP
message—references to certificates or public keys, etc. Con-
tent Manager will be designed as a pluggable framework to
accommodate new types of objects in the future.
Locator Manager will be responsible for supplying Store
with locators. A locator is an identifier of a resource on the
Internet. It may be a URL, International Resource Identifier
(IRI), Extensible Resource Identifier (XRI), or any other es-
tablished type of locator, but may also be of a proprietary
type if a convenient format for a particular use has not been
5Since SCVP is not widely supported by relying party software, the
engine will provide an SCVP proxy that accepts forms and produces
results in the HTML format; the proxy will communicate with a true
SCVP-based validation authority internally.
6The X-KISS protocol also supports PGP- and SPKI-based public key
infrastructures which, for the moment, are outside the scope of the pro-
posed PKI search engine.
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Fig. 5 Backend architecture for
the PKI search engine
Fig. 6 Frontend architecture for
the PKI search engine
established by the industry. Locator Manager receives loca-
tors from:
– Internet Miners shown on the left in Fig. 5.
– Content Manager that may discover locators as part of
PKI objects and other objects.
– Known Locators and Objects Store populated either by
the search engine administrators or end users.
– Site Manager that, given a locator, may derive additional
locators related to the same site.
An auxiliary role performed by Locator Manager will be
to supply raw locators to Site Manager for further analy-
sis. Site Manager will be responsible for identifying Inter-
net sites from locators supplied to it by other components
and managing site information in Store. It will also supply
derived locators to Locator Manager for further processing.
Downloader will be responsible for downloading objects
from the Internet given their locators. The objects will be
passed to Content Manager for processing. Downloader will
be fed by Downloader’s queue which will contain a list
of object locators prioritized for downloading. Downloader
may be implemented as a multi-threaded or a distributed
component; whatever the implementation, it will respect pri-
orities assigned by Scheduler whose role will be to analyze
the known locators and objects in Store and decide on the
relative deadlines for their updates.
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Internet Miners will be responsible for mining the Inter-
net and supplying the search engine with potentially inter-
esting objects. For example, a Web crawler may discover
objects (PKCS #7 files, certificates, CRLs, etc.) referenced
by Web pages. The search engine may use its own Web
crawler and/or use services of external Web crawlers such
as those maintained by established search engines (Google,
Yahoo!, Bing, A9, etc.). DNS Miner will be responsible for
discovering DNS domains and probing them for PKI-related
information stored, for example, in CERT or SRV resource
records (see Sect. 5). Other Internet Miners may be added to
the search engine in the future if needed.
Several interactive applications will be part of the search
engine (Fig. 6). First, Search and Retrieval Application will
allow users to search for end-entity and CA public keys,
public certificates and CRLs. Search and Retrieval Appli-
cation will also be able to display the global PKI network,
its various connectivity components, layers, etc. In addi-
tion, Search and Retrieval Application will support lookup
of point-of-contact information for registered CAs. Manual
Submission Application will allow users to “manually” sub-
mit locators and objects. The objects may be PKI objects or
composite objects requiring further parsing and object ex-
traction. Registration Application will allow users to regis-
ter certification authorities (CAs) and their points of contact
by providing the CAs’ self-signed certificates and filling out
forms containing information about the CAs’ administrators
and managers. It will also allow site registration. Adminis-
tration Application will be provided for administrators to
manage all aspects of the search engine.
In addition to applications for human users, the frontend
will provide a variety of services for programmatic access
as discussed in Sect. 3. All of them are represented by the
Services component in Fig. 6.
5 Supported objects and repositories
The fundamental objects the PKI search engine must sup-
port are (a) public keys, (b) public X.509 version 3 certifi-
cates [7, 39], and (c) X.509 version 2 certificate revoca-
tion lists (CRLs) [7, 39]. Certificates and CRLs, of course,
serve as containers for public keys that can be extracted
from them for storage and further processing. They can
also be viewed as hyperlinked documents carrying refer-
ences to PKI repositories in such extensions as Author-
ity Information Access, Subject Informa-
tion Access, and (Freshest) CRL Distribu-
tion Points [7]. In addition, the Certificate
Policies extension (in a CA certificate) may contain
pointers to the respective certification policy statements and
notices that can be extracted and presented to the PKI en-
gine’s users as part of metainformation about the CA.
Table 1 PKI-related LDAP attributes [33]
Attribute name Description
authorityRevocationList A CRL reflecting revocation
status of certificates issued to
certification authorities
cACertificate A CA certificate
certificateRevocationList A CRL
crossCertificatePair A cross-certificate pair that
contains a cross-certificate is-
sued by the CA to another
CA and/or a cross-certificate
issued to the CA by the other
CA
deltaRevocationList A delta CRL containing in-
formation on certificates re-
voked after a certain ver-
sion of the main (base) CRL
or after a particular point in
time [1]
userCertificate An end-entity certificate
The PKI search engine will be able to process many types
of composite objects that may contain PKI objects:
– PKI-related LDAP attributes enumerated in Table 1.
– LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF) files as defined
by RFC 2849 [14]. Since an LDIF file represents a dump
of a subtree of an LDAP-based directory, the PKI search
engine will mine these files for RFC 4523-defined object
classes and attributes (Table 1).
– Objects in the Cryptographic Message Syntax format de-
fined by PKCS #7 [20] and RFC 3852 [17]. These ob-
jects may contain public keys, certificates, CRLs and ref-
erences to them.
– DNS CERT resource records (RRs) defined by RFC
4398 [19]. This standard defines multiple types of objects
stored in CERT RRs; of interest to the PKI search engine
are PKIX records representing X.509 certificates and IP-
KIX records representing references to X.509 certificates.
– DNS SRV resource records for _PKIXREP, a service
type defined by RFC 4386 [3]. These resource records
contain pointers to LDAP- and HTTP-based PKI repos-
itories as well as OCSP responders.
The PKI objects and composite objects potentially con-
taining PKI objects may be found in many types of reposi-
tories on the Internet. The PKI search engine’s backend will
be able to mine LDAP-based repositories for these objects.
It will also support DAP, the Directory Access Protocol [40].
Although it is largely superseded by LDAP, DAP-based di-
rectories are still used to store PKI-related objects.
The search engine will be able to access repositories us-
ing the FTP and HTTP protocols, for example, when given
references (URLs) to single certificates, certificate revoca-
tion lists, or PKCS #7 objects. The engine will also support
J Internet Serv Appl (2010) 1: 83–93 91
the specialized HTTP-based certificate store access protocol
defined in [15]. This protocol can be used to look up cer-
tificates based on client-defined criteria. Similarly, the PKI
engine’s backend will be able to access X-KISS Locate
service [16] end points on the Internet to find X.509 certifi-
cates using subject names, key names, key identifiers, and
public keys.
The PKI search engine’s backend will also take advan-
tage of the PKI Resource Query Protocol (PRQP) [22]. A
PRQP responder acts as a directory service for PKI-related
resources and may be used to locate certificates and certifi-
cate revocation lists.
Finally, the search engine will support well-known com-
munity repositories such as Trans-European Research and
Education Networking Association’s Academic CA Reposi-
tory (TACAR) [47], possibly implementing proprietary pro-
tocols.
6 Discussion
Given the scope of the proposed PKI search engine it is ex-
pected that it will need to store large quantities of infor-
mation and service a very large user community. The en-
gine will have distributed architecture with a main site hold-
ing a writable copy of the persistent store and a number of
replicated mirror sites each holding a read-only copy. End
users will be directed to the mirror sites through the use
of round robin DNS and load balancers. This architecture
will provide high availability, scalability, and performance
required by the service. Each copy of the store will be im-
plemented using a commercial relational database manage-
ment system (RDBMS) such as Oracle Database or Mi-
crosoft SQL Server. Commercial state-of-the-industry hard-
ware with virtualized environments running the Linux op-
erating system will be used to host all components of the
search engine. Most of the software will be developed in
Java; performance-sensitive modules will be written in C
and C++.
To ensure availability, best practices in IT management
and business continuity management will be followed by the
service providers hosting the engine’s components. Special
attention will also be given to security. Appropriate tech-
nical, physical, procedural, and personnel controls will be
put in place to guarantee continuous operation of the engine.
Safe Web application development guidelines such as those
provided by the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) [44] will be followed when developing the en-
gine’s frontend (Fig. 6). In addition to sound development
and management practices, the engine’s distributed archi-
tecture should help mitigate against security compromises,
including denial of service attacks. The main site will not be
accessible from the Web, and all replication links will oper-
ate in one direction, from the main site to the mirrors. Each
link will be secured using an IPSec-based virtual private net-
work (VPN) [9]. Requests coming through the frontend will
not be able to modify the mirror stores. Because of the built-
in redundancy the engine should be able to continue to op-
erate even when some of the mirror sites are under attack.
Even if the PKI search engine is known to be secure,
why should end users trust information they receive from
it? What level of assurance can be given by its certificate
validation services? We expect that enterprises (private cor-
porations, governments, military institutions) will continue
building their own certificate validation infrastructures and
will use the proposed engine only when designing, imple-
menting, testing and troubleshooting them. They may, how-
ever, encourage continual use of our engine’s discovery ser-
vices by their end users if it is known to provide fast and ac-
curate results. The engine can also attract the “unattached”
consumer community; here its validation services may find
their biggest market as in most cases consumers will seek
only reasonable practical assurance that the results provided
by the engine are correct. If the engine provides services
as expected, over time it will build a good reputation in
the user community, and more users will be willing to trust
it. In addition, the engine’s practices could be certified by
an independent organization such as WebTrust or TRUSTe.
Further, a customized certification and auditing regime by
a third party could be developed for the engine’s validation
services, and that, in turn, may lead to the acceptance by
communities with higher assurance requirements.
Privacy may also be of concern for users supplying infor-
mation to our PKI engine. Although each certificate or CRL
contains publicly available data, their aggregation may leak
information and allow unwanted inferencing. Development
of policies and algorithms that balance the engine’s need to
be powerful and useful, on the one hand, and the users’ need
for privacy, on the other, is one of the subjects of our future
work.
7 Related work
Many of the standards referenced in this paper were de-
signed with the goal of improving usability and simplify-
ing management of Public Key Infrastructures. Some de-
fine protocols and data formats aimed at discovery of PKI-
related objects and services by human users and software
agents [3, 7, 15, 16, 19, 22, 33, 46]. Others govern the use of
(delegated) certificate validation services [12, 16, 21]. The
standards do not define the scope of PKI repositories or ser-
vices they describe, and leave it to implementers. For exam-
ple, a certificate repository may service a single certification
authority, a hierarchical PKI, a group of related CAs, a com-
munity of users, etc. Our proposal is complementary to these
standards as it defines an operational service implementing
them in a single context, that of the global PKI.
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Practical needs prompted many certification authoriti-
es, bridges, communities of interest, and others to estab-
lish well-known PKI repositories facilitating access to com-
monly needed resources (see, for example, [47]). The pro-
posed PKI search engine differs from them in its scope and
scale, and also in the mechanism it uses for gathering infor-
mation: most of it will be automatically collected on the In-
ternet through mining (although manual registration by end
users will also be available).
Global-scale PKI services have also been proposed. Re-
cently Pala introduced the Public Key System (PKS), a PKI
resource discovery infrastructure based on distributed hash
tables [23]. In his scheme each CA has a responder in the
PKS that advertises services on its behalf (for example, cer-
tificate revocation checking); the responder’s network ad-
dress is computed based on the fingerprint of the CA’s pub-
lic key. Responders form an overlay network that supports
efficient routing and node discovery. Relying parties access
the PKS via local PKS servers. The PKS is different from
the PKI search engine we propose in that it is CA-centric;
our service, in addition to providing CA-related informa-
tion, will allow to locate end-user certificates based on vari-
ous search criteria and to perform relying party-centric ser-
vices such as certification path construction and validation.
(In the future it could use the PKS as one discovery mech-
anism to locate services provided by a CA given that CA’s
public key.) The PKS also requires clients to implement a
new protocol (to access a local server); our engine, on the
other hand, will rely only on existing standards.
8 Conclusions and future work
This paper proposes a PKI search engine, a service that does
for the global PKI what search engines such as Google do
for the Web. On the one hand, the Public Key Infrastructure
is vital to proper functioning of many Internet protocols and
applications such as document signing, Web server secu-
rity, secure e-mail, Web Services security, virtual private net-
works, electronic commerce, and single sign-on [10]. On the
other hand, understanding, management and troubleshoot-
ing of the global PKI remain problematic. As the global PKI
mesh becomes more complex, it will present further chal-
lenges to end users and administrators alike.
By combining Internet-mining capabilities with direct
voluntary registration the PKI search engine can accumulate—
in a single repository—large amounts of information about
the global PKI. This information can be used to provide
valuable tools to end users to locate individual PKI objects
(certificates, certificate revocation lists, and public keys) or
PKI repositories, perform certificate validation, or visualize
the global PKI mesh to better understand trust relationships
that exist between an individual user or organization and the
rest of the world.
The user community of the search engine may include
end users of PKI, for example, ordinary users that need to
send encrypted e-mail and locate public certificates of mes-
sage recipients, as well as PKI administrators that need to
design, implement, test, maintain, and troubleshoot their or-
ganizations’ PKIs.
Our future work will focus on implementing a realistic
proof of concept of the proposed PKI search engine. First,
we plan to implement the backend infrastructure shown in
Fig. 5. Then we will develop DNS Miner and a Web crawler
to feed the persistent store. In parallel, we will develop
rudimentary versions of Registration Application, Manual
Submission Application, and Search and Retrieval Applica-
tion (Fig. 6) with the goal of enhancing them over time to
bring them to the expected level of usability and perfor-
mance. Once these components are in place, we will fo-
cus on programmatic access to the service. Google’s expe-
rience showed that a realistic prototype (that, among other
things, allows to evaluate scalability of the product) can be
built inexpensively with readily available software and hard-
ware [5]. We plan to use this experience in our work.
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